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The Descent into the Underworld and 
Modern Black Fiction 
Michael G. Cooke 
There is 
"nojthing so old," the great West Indian poet, Derek Walcott, has writ 
ten, "that it [can] not be invented." But even as we recognize this as a crucial 
intuition, we acknowledge an age-old superstition about priority, and may well 
wonder if the latter-day poet has not entered into special pleading to stop his 
new "invention" from seeming just another d?j? vu. This is a pitfall of modern 
black literature that Imamu Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones) aggressively avoids 
when he asserts that black writers open up and illuminate a distinct "room" of 
their owni, thus achieving simple independence and originality. The trouble is 
that the black writer may then seem to speak to, as well as about, only that 
narrow "room" (though Baraka puts it into a "big house"). Either way black 
literature stands to suffer neglect: as a more or less negligible instance of some 
thing familiar, or as a more or less negligible phenomenon for being merely 
unfamiliar. 
But there is implicit in Baraka's architectural image a revelation of new dimen 
sions, and a new economy of relations, in the "house" of literature; and by the 
same token Walcott is teaching us a new form of the old adage, to wit, that the 
more it is the same thing, the more it changes. The new room or the new poem 
exists in an altered, or an altering, environment, and 
serves to remind us that 
every occurrence at once reaffirms and conjures with its category, setting new 
limits for it, and revealing tacit limitations in earlier examples. 
Among the ways in which modern black literature must seem at once remini 
scent and pioneering is its development in fiction of the theme of the descent 
into the underworld. For the psycho-cultural meaning of blackness, its implicit 
perils and resources, attaches in a distinctive 
manner to this theme. The pri 
mary force of Baraka's The System of Dante's Hell derives from the terrible, 
punishing ordinariness of the situation for black people and from the fact that 
there appears no hope of purgation, let alone salvation. No group 
or class as 
such has ever said that to belong is to be in hell. In like manner the virtual elimi 
nation of the figure of the guide and the role of the underground counselor 
speaks to a singular loss, in modern black experience, of established structures 
of authority, and hence of answerable visions of the future. 
Perhaps this will seem no singular feature of black experience, but instead a 
plain contemporary phenomenon. In the gross, however, it may be observed 
that whatever principles and values may have been jettisoned from white society, 
in all cases where contact has been made (and no literature is available to us 
otherwise), white people economically or politically captain the ship and enjoy 
the perennial structures of power. Not surprisingly this organization is apparent 
in Saul Bellow's Henderson the Rain King. Dahfu, the black king of the Wariri, 
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becomes Henderson's guide and counselor in the virtual underworld of the lion, 
Atti's den, but Dahfu himself thereby violates and risks the animosity and ven 
geance of the upholders of his own ancestral standards. If we recall the connection 
between Atti and At?, a figure of fatality in Greek mythology, the underworld 
ambience of the entire episode seems unmistakable. Atti belongs to Dahfu; she 
is a given of his existence, but only an episode in Henderson's. This is the picture 
from a white writer's standpoint. The black writer's position may be illustrated 
by Ralph Ellison, who sends his nameless protagonist (to have no name is by 
itself an emblem of the lack of ancestral generosity and assurance) to his under 
world only when all sources of plausible authority have been exhausted and lost. 
That is when he fully comes to terms with his blackness. In both cases a: special 
isolation and disorientation would seem to be associated with the underworld 
in modern black literature. 
To represent the development of the theme, I will take up six authors here: 
Jean Toomer, Imamu Baraka, Ralph Ellison, C?mara Laye, Amos Tutuola, and 
Wilson Harris. The list includes American, African, and West Indian writers, 
and thus affords a breadth sufficient to make a basis for plausible generalizations 
concerning the modernization and accommodation of the theme. It;is,perhaps 
conspicuous that the list excludes Richard Wright, but in the face of an? evocative 
and ubiquitous myth, it has seemed wise to bound the topic with some care. As 
Joseph Campbell makes plain in his study of The Hero with a Thousand Faces, 
nearly everything above or under the sun, and every enclosure above or under 
the ground, may qualify as an underworld locus (he cites, e.g., temple.interiors; 
the belly of a whale; the heavenly land beyond, above, or below the conven 
tional world). But one should distinguish between central and partial uses of 
the underworld. The underworld occurs in Wright's Native Son, but in an allusive 
and unsystematic way. The cloacal escape hatch in "The Man Who Lived Un 
derground" and even the storefront church in James Baldwin's Go Tell It on the 
Mountain have underworld associations, but not in a sustained or substantial 
degree. The examples I have chosen to deal with have in common an explicit 
application of the descent into the underworld to the action of the text, so that 
the theme becomes a principle of construction and interpretation, arid not an 
opportunity for critical relen?essness or ingenuity. 
The System of Dante's Hell is the most formal representation of the; descent 
into the underworld in modern black literature. It invokes Dante, and draws on 
his terminology, without in the least pretending to model itself on him; its 
circles are made linear, as ditches, and though Baraka himself suggests. grada 
tion, or degradation, in placing the heretics last, for the worst shall be the last, 
all are essentially simultaneous. Each section is an angle, a perspective on one 
single frame of experience. And no reader will fail to see that the descent into 
Bottom, in "The Heretics," belies its nomenclature by containing, in however 
tainted a form, the only morsel of human relief and imaginable grace, that the 
text affords. D. H. Lawrence enjoins us to heed the novel, not the author, and 
The System of Dante's Hell certainly seems to say that heresy is everywhere. 
"Treachery to Kindred," immediately preceding "The Heretics" in Circle 9, in 
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volves treachery to self, and vice versa. The material admits of analysis by 
episode or character or scene or reflection or "association complexes," but these 
are interpenetrating, and indivisible, notwithstanding the illusion of sequence 
created by the page. 
The text never quite makes an explicit identification of the treachery of others 
to the self, but this, the pervasive evil of The System, is dramatized in "The 
Eighth Ditch (Is Drama" (sic). Here again we need to remember that hell is 
all, or all is hell, for Baraka. The Ur-treachery occurs with creation and birth. 
One is given a life that cannot be lived, a gift of words that limn negation, a 
sense of substance and space that camouflage "these shadows" and vacancy. 
When he identifies himself with Dante, the speaker proves a Dante with a dif 
ference. For the first time he has a guide, but it is only "the other guy" who him 
self stands in need of a guide, since "he pointed, like Odysseus . . . like Virgil, 
the weary shade," and we know that a weary Virgil (only his voice is weary in 
the Commedia) can hardly lead further and Odysseus not at all. It is not sur 
prising that the "other guy" points out nothing but more hell: 
He pointed, like Odysseus would. Like Virgil, the weary shade, at some 
circle. For Dante, me, the young wild virgin of the universe to look. To see 
what terror. What illusion. What sudden shame, the world is made. 
The poetic texture of the final sentence declares the coincidence of creation and 
a state of hell. For the speaker sees the shame into which the world is fallen, but 
also the shame of the fact that the creation has taken place. Only Peaches, para 
doxically in "The Heretics," has the instincts or the energy to try to bully or 
guide him out of this shame, but his instincts and energy, perhaps more faithful 
to the intrinsic ordination of things (Peaches after all promises but sensual savvy 
and peace), are equal only to making good his escape from the improbabilities 
of hope. 
This escape may resemble an ultimate state in the text, but again the uniformity 
of The System at bottom, the pervasiveness of "heresy" must be regarded as the 
primary fact. It is not possible, given all we have seen and learned, for the 
speaker to do otherwise than escape from the temptation of hope. Baraka de 
scribes heresy as a matter of "running in terror, from one's deepest responses and 
insights, . . . the denial of feeling . . ." and classifies it as "basest evil." Undenia 
bly this sums up the speaker's relation to Peaches. But it is not an exclusive phe 
nomenon. The System begins with a thorough "denial of feeling," and a degree 
of "terror" that forbids running and results instead in paralysis. 
The very first circle of The System introduces us to a world with less of life 
than the sixth, and the ninth at least abounds in action, and boasts Peaches. The 
book, moving as Baraka says from "association complexes" (a variant of stream 
of-consciousness) to "fast narrative," also moves from inertness to activity. The 
initial sense it gives is of increase, rather than decrease, of engagement and value, 
but in fact the "association complexes" serve as an irresistible gravitational field 
and controlling (not to say suppressing) environment for the "fast narratives." 
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From the outset The System of Dante's Hell offers a curiously curt, cold, face 
less set of images so far disembodied of human valences as to lose even the con 
solation of grammar. "Faces seep together" here, and summer itself "seemed 
cold." It is a universe in which life is betrayed into a grim, bleak unfeelingness 
and deprivation. It depends on images, but "the image is cold, without space, a 
dead talking of earth." 
"Hell," Baraka says in the postscript to the text, "is definable only in 
. . . 
terms" of his being "a social animal." He can "get no place else," so that without 
society the very notion of hell "didn't exist." But ultimately his hell subsists by 
being recognized. It is a conscious state of cold annihilation, into which no 
amount of fast narration can infuse enough friction to ignite a spark or seed of 
life. Thus hell ends up existing "in the head," and the reader, despite the numer 
ous 
autobiographical notes in the text, may begin to see not the autobiography 
but the anesthesia of an attitudinal despair anchored in a wraith-like flow of 
memories. 
Can one, we may well ask, have a sense of death, who shows so little sense of 
life? But the point is of course that Baraka apprehends black life as death, and 
the descent into the underworld as the descent into the status of the self, as 
black. What in Coleridge is a singular dreadful state of death-in-life becomes a 
standard condition: the "lust of the world" is "fashioned into snow," and so is 
at once 
negated and preserved. "Nothing remains," Baraka then writes, ". 
. . 
except . . . the pure image. Nothing remains." And if we take this as a form of 
rampant self-pity, a piece of slack and shapeless generalization, it may be that 
we have grown as habituated to its truth as its victims, who by virtue of The 
System may enjoy the cold comfort of consciousness. 
And yet it must seem that The System, for all its power, lacks a certain dimen 
sionality and falls into a certain flatness, since it immediately establishes, by 
tone and image, a deathliness in black life and thereupon proceeds to put that 
deathliness into its narrow underworld motion. Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man 
presents itself by contrast as a richly formed complex on the subject of American 
life, indeed of modern life, with a black protagonist. The very absence of an 
article in the book's tide, as opposed to H. G. Wells' simpler portrayal of a sci 
ence fiction detective story world, carries us at once into a universal frame; we 
are dealing with the condition of man, and not with "a" 
man 
merely, or even 
"the" man whose story unfolds before us. 
It is striking, however, that Invisible Man yields the same conception of a hell 
built into black life as does The System. Perhaps if Ellison had not written 
Baraka would not have carried out his theme so thoroughly, without remission or 
qualification. For Ellison's view of blackness as hell, while not engrossing all 
activities and aspects of life to the exclusion of other possibilities, certainly per 
vades his novel. The theme of the underworld is all but explicidy presented in 
the introductory episodes. The incident in the Golden Day (itself ironically 
named to suggest an eschatological perfection) carries the strongest hints of an 
underworld condition, especially where the vet dismisses the narrator and Mr. 
Norton with the brusque injunction: "Now the two of you descend the stairs 
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into chaos and get the hell out of here." The fact that the narrator has conducted 
Norton to the Golden Day, and the insistence that Norton is obscurely pursuing 
his 
"destiny," only reinforce the underworld association, with the narrator 
as an 
ironically helpless and inadvertent guide. The fear the frequenters of the Golden 
Day have that Norton will die among them, or is dead ("DEAD!?.... He caint 
die!"), also carries overtones of the return from the dead. But Norton* even if 
his destiny is embodied in the black student, may leave the Golden Day, the 
ghetto* and the school itself, virtually at will. The narrator and the black com 
munity experience all of this not as some ultimate destiny, but as very life, and 
we need to recognize that the school, if it is a source of upward mobility for the 
narrator, allows him to move up out of hell. 
There are even earlier indications of underworld dimensions to black experi 
ence. In the novel's opening pages the undated episode from the narrator's past 
where "under the spell of the reefer" he "discovered a new analytical way of lis 
tening to music," to Louis' music, to jazz, is almost formally organized in terms 
of familiar underworld categories. "I not only entered the music," the narrator 
reveals; supposedly in an "analytical" vein, 
but descended, like Dante,-into its depths. And beneath the swiftness of 
the hot tempo there was a slower tempo and a cave and I entered it, . . . 
and beneath that lay a still lower level . . . , and below that I found a lower 
level. . . 
As if this were not patent enough, the ceremony he comes upon resounds with 
underworld allusions, to "The whale's belly," for example, and to the death of 
the father and the possibility of the sparagmos we associate with Adonis and 
Osiris: "Them boys woulda tore him to pieces with they homemade : knives." 
Ellison is clearly inviting us, with two such disparate incidents, as the novel is 
getting under way, to apprehend black life in terms of ineluctable connections 
with the underworld. Like Baraka, too, he makes the underworld more than a 
matter of what happens to be there, as it were for the reader to see. He brings 
it to consciousness, through the vet in the Golden Day, through the narrator in 
the exploration of the idiom of jazz, and most importandy (for these are:trained 
minds and unusual characters) through the simple widow of the dead pater 
familias. She is moaning when the narrator comes upon her, but she is weeping 
with a new distress when he leaves, at her insistence: "Leave me Tone^boy; my 
head aches." For this one of her stalwart sons beats him up, but it puzzles him 
to get treated so: 
"What's the matter, man?" I cried. 
"You made Ma 
cryF' 
"But how?" I said, dodging a blow. 
"Askiri her them questions, that's how. Git outa liere and stay, and next 
time you got questions like that, ask yourself!" 
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Finally, though all is hell, the consummation of hell is its rendering into con 
sciousness of a life that cannot be lived, with principles that cannot be known, 
in an environment that cannot sustain. In other words, as Baraka says, "Hell in 
the head." 
It is possible then to read Invisible Man as the tensional process that brings 
the narrator, through the stations of his ambition (very selfish at first, more al 
truistic later, but always mistaken), to the realization that his life, and black life, 
is hell. The novel affords an ostensible rising action, at least in terms of the 
narrator's psyche and expectations, up to the point where the "director of Men's 
House" addresses the narrator "with profound respect," and the narrator is aware 
that his "new name" is getting around. Here is the acme, and the end, of his 
"days of certainty." But even during the time of prospect unheeded threats of 
the underworld may be noted. The Founder "lay nine days in a death-like 
coma?" and then it is "as though he had risen from the dead." This is the promise 
of a new life that makes death-in-life endurable, and somehow even desirable. 
The explosion in the paint factory ( Brockway's fief dorn is an underworld in which 
the narrator pursues conventional goals) leaves the narrator sinking "to the cen 
ter of a lake of heavy water," a sort of King Arthur who has, however, "lost ir 
revocably an important victory." And the narrator, just before he takes charge 
of the eviction scene and begins apparendy to come into his own, has quite a 
contrary vision of himself tottering "on the edge of a great dark hole." 
None of these intimations comes home to him, but in the rapid falling action 
of the final third of the text he begins to note new signs, begins to theorize, be 
gins to develop such range and promptness of response as will enable him to 
understand and work from the underground that becomes peculiarly, and yet 
symbolically, his. The pivotal moment occurs with his facing Clifton's perception 
that "sometimes a man has to plunge outside history . . . ." The image of plung 
ing anticipates the manhole, and occurs elsewhere with a similar resonance, but 
here it involves an element of logical choice: given certain conditions, one must 
do one thing in order not to do another. Certainly when Clifton drops out of the 
Brotherhood the narrator reflects that it "was as though he had chosen ... to 
fall outside of history." 
To the extent that it presupposes choice this plunging remains false to the 
underworld experience of blacks. The narrator does not have to plunge, logically, 
he plunges naturally. That is the way of things. And we readily note that the 
narrator's mind slips from the idea of choice to the image of plunging, the pri 
mordial fear of being given over to gravity not just in body but in mind and soul. 
He himself is clinging to the Brotherhood: "For to break away would be to plunge 
... To plunge!" He has the sensation of it here, sympathetically. But almost at 
once it becomes inwardly, direcdy his own experience. 
It is tempting to say that, with the underworld now open to him, he gravitates 
toward the subway. Certainly as he "wander[sl down" he is aware of his "mind 
plunging." A sense of his own precariousness sweeps over him, though he per 
sists in the belief that the Brotherhood has saved him from it: 
77 Criticism 
What did they ever think of us transitory ones? Ones such as I had been 
before I found Brotherhood?birds of passage who were too obscure for 
learned classification, too silent for the most sensitive recorders of sound ... ? 
Still short of recognizing his own underworld status, he sees that in "three [black] 
boys" walking down the subway platform "like dancers in some kind of funeral 
ceremony." We need to remember that the funeral image, reinforcing the idea 
that some of the 
"transitory ones" have in the subway left the realm of life, is 
produced by his mind, as a means of coming to grips with their blackness. 
Throughout the passage, with simile and questions, he is groping toward a new 
level of apprehension. He begins to follow them, and spontaneously formulates 
the awareness that he will artificially deny, or displace into speculation for a 
while, the awareness that death informs black experience, which passes in a 
special underworld. Indeed, within the framework of speculation, he evinces 
an impulse to redeem, to recognize value in, that deathly underworld: 
And suddenly I found myself thinking, Do they [the boys in the funeral 
ceremony] come to bury the others or to be entombed, to give life or to 
receive it? . . . The boys speak a jived-up transitional language full of country 
glamour, think transitional thoughts, though perhaps they dream the same 
old ancient dreams. They were men out of time .... But who knew (and 
now I began to tremble so violently I had to lean against a refuse can) ? 
who knew but that they were the saviors, the true leaders, the bearers of 
something precious? The stewards of something uncomfortable, burden 
some, . . . living outside the realm of history 
.... What if history was not 
a reasonable citizen, but a madman full of paranoid guile and these boys 
his agents, his big surprise! His own revenge? For they were outside, in 
the dark with Sambo, . . . taking it on the lambo with my fallen brother, 
Tod Clifton (Tod, Tod) .... 
The boys are with Tod, and the plangent play on his name (Tod, death) con 
summates the definition of the underworld condition with a note of personal 
mourning. 
The notes of identification between the narrator and the transitory, excluded, 
effectively chthonian ones break through his declarations of difference to inform 
us that he has joined them spiritually, though not yet avowedly. With an ironic 
allusion to another underworld he strives to resume his efforts at 
"mastery" of 
the social and political world: "I had found the thread of reality." But his dreams 
give away his deepest position: "instead of Clifton being lost it was myself." In 
addition, the falsity and hopelessness of his opposing the transitory ones and 
touting the Brotherhood stand out graphically where the Brotherhood celebrate 
Jack's birthday "at the Chthonian." As Satan might say, "which way I turn is Hell." 
The narrator emulates others; he becomes Clifton. He takes to himself the verb 
"to plunge," and by the time we get to the race riot the underworld references 
are increasing and intensifying enough to seem either calculated, or integral to 
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Ellisons conception. An Acherontic river flows through the scene, "a black river 
ripping through a black land" early in the riot, and at its conclusion, when the 
narrator has 
"plunge [d] down, down" into the manhole, he seems "to move out 
upon black water." The text affords us too a candid gloss of his condition: "It's a 
kind of death without hanging, ... a death alive." In addition to this, "Ras the 
Destroyer" on his "great black horse" has seemed a figure out of an anti-apoca 
lypse, where salvation is ruled out, though summary judgment is executed, or 
threatened. And it is instructive that the white hoodlums who chase the narrator 
to the unforeseen manhole 
represent equally summary executioners. They ask one 
another, suggestively, if he is dead, that is, not just underground but in the under 
world, and his response, to himself, after escaping two physical executions, is to 
confess that the answer is metaphorically, spiritually, immemorially, "yes." His 
"invisibility" is not only socio-psychological, but eschatological ... he is a miser 
able social wraith: 
. . . You stand naked and shivering before the millions of eyes who look 
through you unseeingly. That is the real soul-sickness, the spear in the side, 
the drag by the neck through the mob-angry town, the Grand Inquisition, 
the embrace of the Maiden, the rip in the belly with the guts spilling out, 
the trips to the chamber with the deadly gas that ends in the oven so hy 
gienically clean?only it's worse because you continue stupidly to live. 
The definitive presence of the underworld in Invisible Man, establishing at 
once character and environment, may give some warrant for construing the final 
line of the novel as a message from the underworld: "Who knows but that, on 
the lower frequencies, I speak for you?" (italics added). If so, then the faintly 
ominous tone of this conclusion (as the post-manhole "Prologue" reveals, to fail 
to see him may bring on a terrible beating) is relieved and even redeemable. The 
denizen of the underworld, the "disembodied voice," is not cut off from his neigh 
bor, or from the sense of humanity. However obscurely and tenuously, some new 
good may ensue. And surely an index of resurrection inheres in the combined 
image of blood and butterfly that virtually frames the novel, occurring in the 
grotesque battle royal and in the final dream of castration (the association of 
loss of light and castration in psychoanalytic theory need hardly be mentioned, 
nor the mythological association of castration with gods who must go to the 
underworld). 
In the former scene, the narrator watches "a dark red spot of my own blood 
shaping itself into a butterfly, glistening and soaking into the soiled gray world 
of the canvas." In the latter scene, he lies "beside a river of black water," is cut, 
and sees "a glittering butterfly circle three times around my blood-red parts." The 
language suggests the same butterfly, interchangeably glistening or glittering, and 
probably the same underworld universe that is alternatively "soiled gray" or a 
black river. Certainly it is the same blood, with the same implications of violation, 
and loss of identity if not life. In this complex, the butterfly must be identified 
with psyche, with the soul, converting and transcending the dismal facts into 
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something-on a higher frequency. Perhaps it takes something away from this hint 
of affirmation that the narrator is put down as a "mystic idealist," but we may 
recall that he has gone through hell to reach this position, and may be entided to 
it. 
There is no doubt a modern American component in the thoroughness with 
which blackness and the underworld become associated in Baraka and Ellison's 
work. Given the idea, already developed, that bringing the underworld quality 
of black experience to consciousness constitutes the quintessence of hell, Ellison 
may be regarded as prophetic in his vision; the great stimulus to this conscious 
ness, as Eldridge Cleaver makes plain, came in 1954, "the year segregation was 
oudawed by the U.S. Supreme Court." Prior to that, Cleaver asserts, "we lived 
in an atmosphere of novocain," but Invisible Man dates from 1952. Perhaps in 
fact Ellison's kind of consciousness entered into the legal and political decision of 
1954, which in turn aggravated and enlarged that consciousness, until Baraka 
himself, then under thirty years of age, could produce The System of Dante's 
Hell with its unrelieved and universal portrayal of hell in 1963. 
Earlier American literary works, and African and West Indian works of the 
last two decades, though they may evince the same idea, do not evince it with 
the same intensity or the same mood. In Jean Toomer's Cane (1923) the under 
world implications of black experience in America are, so to speak, kept under 
ground, and even to some extent denied, or renounced, or obliterated by a bright 
burst of hope. The underworld element in the work appears concentrated in the 
dominant, closing story, "Kabnis," and indeed is focused by, and on, the peculiari 
ties of Kabnis' temper. The standards and customs of the Georgia town he 
sojourns in as a teacher hardly represent a pastoral ideal, but the wagonsmith 
and all-purpose repairman Halsey ("wonderfully himself") and his mysteriously 
innocent sister Carrie Kate show a 
viability and grace beyond the compulsions of 
place. It is a neurasthenia in Kabnis, verging on a comical paranoia where he flees 
from a supposed threat of white lynching, that makes the town effectively an 
underworld. He feels that he 
"might just as well be in his grave," that everything 
is "still as a grave"; his sense of "many dead things moving in silence" is an intui 
tion of the actual world of people and objects without the illusion of corporeality, 
rendered in their true wraith-like state. 
But a confirmation of Kabnis' intuition emerges when, driven from his teach 
ing post and living place, he goes to live and work with Halsey. As substantial, 
sane, even serene as he is in himself, and as material and practical as is his oc 
cupation, Halsey proves to be the one who harbors Kabnis' proof, and that proof 
exists in Halsey's own basement, "The Hole," in which Father John, almost de 
prived of sense, passes his waning years as a Wordsworthian combination of 
patriarch and butt. The ambiguity of this circumstance is compounded by the 
fact that Halsey uses "The Hole" for parties "on those occasions when he spices 
up the life of the small town." 
Far from settling the question whether "The Hole" secures certain free expres 
sions of life or contains the character of death, the text widens its own dichotomy. 
Father John may be either "a mute John the Baptist of a new religion?or a 
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tongue-tied shadow of an old." But the underworld quality of his place is brought 
out by Kabnis, with his usual irritable pungency, calling the old man "Father of 
hell," and significandy also by the narrator, the old man being apostrophized as 
Dead blind father of a muted folk who feel their way upward to a life that 
crushes or absorbs them. 
Kabnis himself, while he continues to rail at the old man in terms of the under 
world motif ("You're an old man, a dead fish man, an black at that"), seems 
finally to be railing at something he feels and dreads in himself. Opposition or 
defiance is his mode of action, and so it is both a momentary reaction to Carrie's 
attempt t? save him and a deep revelation of himself when he declares: "I get my 
life down in this scum-hole. The old man an me?" He elects the underworld in 
order to escape it, the hopeless irony of his situation appearing where he tries to 
put himself above Halsey, metonymically reduced to a wagon wheel: 
Great God Almighty, a soul like mine cant pin itself onto a wagon wheel 
an 
satisfy itself in spinnin around. 
Literally he is referring to Halsey's trade, but in rejecting that he is pinning him 
self spiritually to another wheel, Ixion's, with fateful consequences. At this point 
Kabnis anticipates Baraka's conception of the consummate hell, having utterly 
confused and betrayed himself into annihilating heresy. Toomer has Kabnis all 
but recognize this: "Mind me, the only sin is whats done against the soul." 
And yet Toomer has a larger vision than Kabnis, both negatively and posi 
tivelyr-he knows a dimension of sin that Kabnis, the irascible solipsist, cannot 
know, and the dimension of redemption that Kabnis, the irascible rationalist, can 
not imagine. Nor does Halsey, or even Lewis, the even-minded, incisive, 
un 
flinching visitor-observer, with all his education and sensitivity, prove equal to 
expressing Toomer's vision. Rather it is Halsey's sister who is present, and who 
mediates the culmination of the work. Her role appears slender enough in phys 
ical terms, but it is delineated with precise and resonant strokes. Her gentle duti 
fulness, her unresentful suffering, her intuitive intensity and freedom tempered 
by a learned caution, a motherly and womanly depth of being: these features all 
emerge in her first brief appearance, bringing lunch for Halsey and the old man, 
having her electric meeting with Lewis, reporting on the old man's loss of ap 
petite, and belatedly delivering the message she'd been sent with. The narrative 
accords h?r a certain loveliness in "her fresh energy of the morning," and her 
brother, in telling her to help the recalcitrant Kabnis get up to work after a hard 
night of partying in the cellar, may be calling not only on her tact and her 
strength, but on the power of her healing unselfishness and love. 
Carrie is an antithesis, and a rebuke to Kabnis. He exploits his connection with 
the old man in their underworld to give vent to what he dare not bring to light. 
"The old man is a good listener," he says cynically. "He's deaf ... An I can talk 
to him. TeD him anything." By contrast Carrie sustains and heeds the old man: 
81 Criticism 
"He's deaf an blind, but . . . I've heard that the souls of old folks have a way of 
seein things." One can only think that Father John's utterance is a response to 
her faith and empathy. Kabnis expects a kind of intellectual originality, and, not 
finding it, regains his composure with a cynical remark. But the old man ex 
presses an immemorial truth, not something to titillate a palate for novelty, but 
something to weigh and keep faith by: "Th sin whats fixed . . . upon th white 
folks . . i tellin Jesus?lies." The sounds "Boom. Boom. BOOM!" that ensue come 
from 
upstairs, not from above, with a somewhat melodramatic effect. A more 
expressive and a more genuine comment on the old man's pronouncement comes 
from Carrie's act of reverence and prayer before Father John: "Jesus, come." 
Thus Cane concludes with a hint or a hope of redemption, arising out of the 
very environment of its underworld. As between Carrie and Father John, the 
redemption is obviously religious. For the narrator it takes a more naturalistic 
form, as "the sun arises from its cradle in the tree-tops of the forest 
... Gold 
glowing child, it steps into the sky and sends a birth-song slanting down . . . ." 
Where Ellison resorts to a 
neo-metamorphic mythology to achieve a sense of 
redemption, Toomer stays with the natural heavens to proffer 
a 
quasi-anthro 
pomorphic rebirth. The earth may be fallen, even to the underworld that Kabnis 
insists upon and that Halsey and Carrie endorse, but as the "shadows of pines 
are dreams that the sun shakes from its eyes," so the shadowy underworld carries, 
through Carrie and Father John, intimations of a veritable light. 
In the Nigerian Amos Tutuola's Simbi and the Satyr of the Dark Jungle (1955) 
the departure from the harshness of the modern American temper in treating the 
underworld is even more pronounced than in Cane. Tutuola works with a kinetic 
and unpredictable repertory of folklore, fantasy, moral sentence, and picaresque 
and grotesque techniques, all oriented toward a felt audience (and deployed with 
a deadpan ebullience and lively insouciance concerning the stricter formalities of 
usage). Simbi is the story of a young lady, "the most beautiful in [her] village," 
only child of "a wealthy woman," with nothing to do "except to eat and after 
that to bathe and then to wear several kinds of the costliest garments." She is 
possessed of a "beautiful voice [that] could wake deads," and a mind of her own. 
Thus upon the loss of her two dearest friends, "kidnapped from the paths by an 
unknown man," she begins to brood and eventually resolves unalterably to go out 
and get to know "Poverty" and "Punishment." 
This is a precis of just the first two pages of the story, a fairy tale of exquisite 
happiness swiftly pivoting, as a matter of moral choice and sympathy, into elegy 
and terror. But even in the thick of happiness the harshness of the underworld 
strikes the ear; Simbi's voice can wake the dead. Also, the kidnapping by an un 
known man may suggest, by analogy, the story of Proserpine; indeed Simbi will 
find the kidnapper, Dogo, sells his victims onto "the Path of Death," and she 
herself becomes a sort of willful Proserpine. There is a further suggestion of 
Orpheus in the powers of Simbi's voice. In this light the main body of the story 
stands as a descent into the underworld, with a plaiting of traditional motifs, but 
also with a distinct modern twist: Tutuola makes Dogo a trafficker in slaves, and 
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slavery becomes the path of death, its victims virtual denizens of the underworld. 
Simbi's mission, then, is at once to undo slavery and to harrow hell (this 
Christian dimension of the underworld seems little in evidence otherwise). She 
can do neither, and can barely make good her own escape with only one of her 
friends; the other, with a host of others encountered along the way, is consumed 
by the Satyr. Dogo, however, is thoroughly chastised and made to promise to 
give over his devilish trade; he presumably returns to "his town," which itself 
sounds like a version of the underworld, being "too far and too fearful for other 
people to go there, ... to the end of the world, perhaps." In this respect the 
underworld practically ceases to exist, and the story reaches not a happy ending, 
but a happy prospect. That prospect is not entirely lacking in outline or specifica 
tion. The ostensible moral of the tale is that girls should obey their mothers 
(Simbi ignores her mother's advice at the outset), but a deeper, fuller inculcation 
of traditional culture is diffused through the novel. Not only her mother, but an 
old man?obviously his age is meant to suggest authority and wisdom?gives 
Simbi clear counsel, and various soothsayers and gods out of the age-old culture 
instruct and assist her once she cannot be turned away from her ordeal. Without 
taking away from her own courage and resourcefulness, we must recognize that 
it is the resources and wisdom of her culture that really serve to bring her safely 
home. Even her friend Rali, without Simbi's privileges, has more native wit than 
Simbi herself, and with her good advice standing them in good stead at a crucial 
juncture in the last battie against the Satyr, it is appropriate that she should be 
the one to come back with Simbi and be spared. 
The obvious difference between Tutuola's universe and what we find in the 
modern American image of the black underworld lies in the fact that it is cir 
cumstantial for one, fundamental for the other. A major factor in this difference 
is no doubt the role of ancestral culture. For Tutuola, ancestral culture offers 
itself as 
something wise, creative, generous, protective, resourceful, stable, and 
comprehensive. For Baraka ancestral culture does not exist, and if it exists for 
Ellison it exists as a mirage, or a manhole cover inexplicably absent at the most 
inopportune time. Bledsoe stands as an epitome of this failure, and the white 
leaders?reactionary Southern or Northern liberal?stand as another. The narrator 
of Invisible Man carries in his brief case the essential poisonous products of such a 
culture, and it is necessary for him to realize that 
to light my way out [of the manhole, the underworld] I would have to burn 
every paper in the brief case. 
The same culture that provides a stay against the underworld in Tutuola's 
Simbi furnishes a version of it, from the viewpoint of Clarence, the white pro 
tagonist, in C?mara Laye's The Radiance of the King. But the action of the 
novel, following an obvious crisis of spirit, is such that his subjection to the un 
derworld (the judgment chamber, the repetitive labyrinth of travel, the snake 
pit, the very room in which naked Clarence is shut away from the king are potent 
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underworld images) becomes his path to grace. In his much more complex and 
ironic style, Laye also presents African culture as a source of redemption (meta 
physical or religious), and that even for the foreign white man. 
Basically the method of the novel may be described as stream-of-subconscious 
ness, that is, a step beyond the calculated associations of Joyce, into an area 
where the reader cannot determine whether hallucination, a quasi-pathological 
demoralization and fantastic inventiveness, or a fierce and spiritually desperate 
and harrowing dream unto death is responsible for the curious forms of the ac 
tion. A great sensuous vividness, compatible with any of these interpretations, 
marks the novel. But so does a profound epistemological quandary. Enigmatic 
objects and incidents are common, references to sleeping and dreaming abound, 
and there is clear evidence of Clarence's misconstructions of external events and 
of his gratuitous emotional states; the "mermaid"?sea cow episode would be a 
case in point. Clarence's own position is profoundly problematical, with his very 
sketchy past and his internal inconsistencies, such as his despising blacks and yet 
focusing all his aspirations, from material ambition to tender love to spiritual 
vision, on the blackest of the black, the king. 
Clarence himself purblindly recognizes, the first time he sees the king, the 
kind of sal vific force in blackness that the narrator ultimately establishes: 
Perhaps the midnight of those limbs would help to lift love to its purest 
peak; yes, it kept love at an ideal remove, it prevented it from being changed 
into one knows not what, or only too well ... into a hurtful bestiality. 
And these darknesses were absolute, blacker even in the king than in the 
blackest of his subjects. 
He senses in the king an inner life partaking of "that very life which lies beyond 
death," and he wonders: "Can that be the sort of life I h?ve come here to find?" 
But the very casting of the question falsifies the issue by its drastic division 
between "hurtful bestiality" and that "remote, enigmatic" life. This reflects the 
false dichotomy between the southern capital of Aziana and the northern capital 
of ?drame. ?drame is architectural, Aziana natural; ?drame is densely popu 
lated, Aziana sparsely so, the former involving Clarence in masses of humanity, 
the latter in many single relationships; ?drame is a place of hopeless pursuit and 
movement, Aziana one of distraction or hopeless waiting. These distinctions 
stand out on the surface. But in terms of vital experience there is little to choose 
between the two capitals. In the south the odor of flowers and decay oppresses 
Clarence's senses; in the north it is the odor of grease. The same problems of 
perception occur in both capitals, in ?drame in relation to places and crowds, 
in Aziana to scenes and individuals. The same confusion as to states of dreaming 
and sleeping occurs in both, and the same strong suggestions of the underworld. 
It is not to be taken lighdy that the beggar declares, "The South is everywhere." 
The point of the text is that Clarence must give over his dichotomous thinking, 
his penchant for facile analysis and classification. Thus "the inferno of the senses" 
does not stand utterly apart from the ethereal sublimity of the spirit; rather, in 
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Dantesque manner, that inferno leads complexly, self-denyingly toward that 
height. Very early in the text, as already observed, Clarence has the intuition that 
blackness, however lowly and sensual, may contain in itself the secret of, or the 
way to, ultimate spirituality. The Dioki episode in the snake pit, just before 
Clarence's second and definitive encounter with the king, brings him to confront 
this squarely, and so carries him beyond the helplessness of vanity and illusion 
to the helplessness of despair. To see that light was there throughout, with the 
darkness, to be had for a mere change of perspective, is to see that one may have 
seen before, and to apprehend that the life of darkness reveals both phenomenal 
fact and choice, and that one has chosen the opposite of what one has thought. 
What room, then, for another, saving choice, when the old one cannot be ex 
punged, and when the new one may itself be a snare? 
But Laye's vision is one of the gratuity of grace, and not one of Arminian 
pretension, let alone Calvinist rigor. The beggar's original attempt to express 
the essential nature of the king succeeds by inadvertency, by its very groping: 
"He is . . . ," the beggar says, and again, "He is 
. . 
." It is not necessary to refer 
to the epigraph and the idea of "Le Seigneur" to recognize the Lord in the novel; 
only one king is, and he is, as the beggar finally blurts out, "the king of kings." 
It is He who bestows his bright countenance on Clarence (the Regard of the 
original French title may best be rendered as "countenance," meaning both 
facial character and affirmative recognition, as of the object's right to exist). At 
this culminating moment in the text, Clarence apparendy dies, but in the sense 
of countenance here given and actually contained in the text, he may truly exist 
for the first time. Certainly it is made clear, in the Dioki episode, that when 
Clarence no longer countenances sensuality and bestiality, it ceases to exist: 
Oh! he did not succeed in turning away his eyes straight away. But when 
he had managed to eradicate from his sight and as it were wipe the old 
woman and her serpents from the face of the earth .... 
But we must recall, in order not to fall into Clarence's own fallacy of dichotomous 
thinking, that Dioki has knowledge of the king, has a measure of the truth (is a 
soothsayer) beyond Clarence's own. Her sensuality is grotesque, but her grotesque 
condition (grotto, underworld) is mystical, and Clarence imaginatively goes 
through it, uses its intuition and energy to go to the king. When Dioki insists, "I 
am not the king! ... I am not the king!" she confesses a limitation in herself but 
also implies a dangerous idolatry in Clarence, a tendency to take a chthonian 
divinity for the divinity. 
At no point does the text afford us the luxury of absolute distinction and sim 
ple positions. Its very resemblance to allegory constitutes part of its elusiveness; 
the tendency to allegory in criticism feeds on deficiency in the encountered ob 
ject, and here is no deficiency. Rather we must countenance the fact that Clar 
ence is living at an extremity, if not in extremis, and without constricting the text 
into a record exclusively of either hallucination grounded in an overburdened 
physiology, or a fantasy of moral decay and personal vanity, or a religious vision 
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of the paltriness of the self and the inscrutable path to salvation, let it stand as 
a black man's elaboration of a white man's conception of Africa, with all the 
density and surprise of a system wherein epistemological difficulties, moral and 
social quandaries, and an involved and ambiguous religious vision intertwine. 
As he far exceeds Laye in complexity and involution, the novels of the West 
Indian Wilson Harris may almost seem to become verbal forms of what they 
occupy themselves with in greater or lesser degree?the subject of the under 
world. And in fact Harris is implying that the weight of the human "person" 
naturally and necessarily breaks through the commonsensical, "fashionable" 
surface of the "novel of persuasion," with its crust of social custom and psy 
chological convenience. His emphasis 
on "the person" and his sense of indeter 
minacy?a protean interchangeableness enters into the social, moral, spatial, 
temporal, emotional beings of his characters?give him some distinction even in 
a highly experimental era. The task he sets himself has nothing to do with 
charting, or even formally exploring, the underworld of being; that too much 
implies another place for us to live in secure detachment. Rather Harris' task is 
to come to a lucid acceptance of the flux of the underworld, and, as far as pur 
pose goes, to approach "a profound and difficult vision of the person?a profound 
and difficult vision of essential unity within the most bitter forms of latent and 
active historical diversity." To get at Harris' profound and difficult vision, focus 
ing on the underworld, let us survey Palace of the Peacock. This is actually the 
first of his novels, but, as Kenneth Ramchand observes, it "contains all Harris's 
basic themes, and anticipates his later designs" in a "rounded poetic vision." 
Palace of the Peacock (1960) ends with an apocalyptic access to an ultimate, 
all-encompassing and all-resolving state for the person of the protagonist. In this 
respect it is very much like The Radiance of the King. It uses music instead of 
light as its dominant image, but the "peacock" certainly keeps light before our 
minds and the 
"palace" suggests a royalty very much in keeping with Laye's 
position. More significant differences also appear. It poses epistemological 
quandaries, with the strong possibility that dreaming controls its amplitudes and 
devises its details; almost the first words of the novel are, "I dreamt I awoke." 
But Harris bases himself in the position of uncertainty, whereas Laye exploits it 
from without. Laye, though he makes so much of Clarence's journeying as in a 
quest to make contact with the king, leaves no doubt that waiting, the act of 
faith and hope, is fundamental to that contact; the king really comes to Clarence, 
who does not even ready himself with "good-will" ("charity" is the usual Chris 
tian term). But Harris maintains the active framework of a voyage, a quest, 
going not only through space and time but also through dimensions of space 
and time that seem to make the culminating scene a "geographical" as well as 
metaphysical state. The major difference, however, lies in the fact that the mys 
tical absorption into timelessness is rendered by Laye's narrator as a privileged 
observer, by Harris' narrator as subject and participant. In effect, since there 
is finality, a conception of death in either case, Harris is generating a new con 
ception of the finality of death. 
Two stories, one simple and realistic and perfunctory, the other elaborate and 
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cryptic and symbolic, make up Palace of the Peacock. The simple "facts" are 
that the narrator, a poetic, sensitive, sickly younger brother, is visiting his more 
ambitious, burly, intense, but inhumane older brother, Donne, at the latter's 
landholding in the midst of a largely undeveloped, "primitive" region of the 
Guyanese savannah. This after a separation of some years. A woman named 
Mariella seems to run the place for Donne, and is forthrightly ill-used by him, 
to the younger brother's consternation. The latter idolizes Donne, in the ambigu 
ous way of human idolatry; he at once fears and fears for him, with a displaced 
anxiety, and has since childhood had a dream, reeking of sibling rivalry on the 
surface, where Donne dies riding a horse (possibly a Jungian symbol of un 
controlled passion). The younger brother has an incurable disease of the left 
eye, but finds that that eye, as it were compensating for loss of sight, affords 
him meaningful and revelatory "visions" and "dreams." The main body of Palace 
of the Peacock is a dream compounded of Donne's story, domineering person 
ality, his allusive name, Mariella and her helpless subjugation and resentment, 
and the narrator's poetic in-sight into the kaleidoscopic seething under the ap 
parent fixity of Donne's world. 
The "extractable story" of the dream is well summed up by Ramchand: 
A boat's crew [led by Donne, an early imperialist of the New World] beats 
its way up-river through the Guyanese jungles and rapids towards an 
Amerindian settlement called Mariella, only to find that the folk have fled. 
The crew discover an old Amerindian woman [in hiding] . . . , force her to 
act as their guide, and set off in pursuit of the folk. During the hazardous 
journey beyond Mariella, violence breaks out [and the crew begins to die 
off, from natural causes or by accident. Eventually] the boat is wrecked 
and the rest of the crew meet their deaths .... The crew is made up of 
the descendants and mixtures of peoples . . . belonging historically to dif 
ferent centuries and to successive waves of 
migrants to the Caribbean 
. . . 
Moreover, [it] is a replica of a famous crew that had been drowned on a 
similar exploiting mission some time before, and they . . . shuttle between 
life and death at their author's arbitrary demands ... It is not possible to 
make out whether the crew exist independently or are merely creatures of 
the dreamer's free imagination. 
(From the introduction to the F aber paper-covered edition) 
The two stories link and move as one around the character of Donne, for whom 
the dream-story realizes not only the threat of death harboring in Marietta's 
meek deportment, but his own inner fear of having no indisputable material life, 
of being somehow dead in an underworld of poverty and toil, like his parents: 
"They gave up the ghost before they had well started to live." He enjoins his 
younger brother to "rule the land . . . while you still have a ghost of a chance," 
and the condition of ghostliness seems more immediate and unavoidable than 
he knows. Later he will wonder if he has the 
"ghost of a chance" of changing his 
ways, and the same preeminence of ghost over chance appears. For now, all his 
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ruthless energy has made him the ruler of an effective underworld: "He had 
established himself in his brooding hanging house. Long before he had conquered 
and crushed the region he ruled, annihilating everyone and devouring himself 
in turn." Man, like the boat's crew, is in a condition of "living and dying together 
in a common grave." 
The interchangeability of life and death and the imitative economy of the 
underworld stand out clearly in connection with Cameron. Like Donne, Cameron 
"wanted space and freedom to use his own hands in order to make his own 
primitive home and kingdom on earth, hands that would rule everything, magical 
hands dispensing life and death ... as a witch doctor would or a tribal god and 
judge." But it is clear that Cameron goes beyond Donne's desire to "rule the 
land." He wishes to rule 
mortality itself as an exempt and, conspicuously, 
non 
redemptive god; he saves himself, others he will not save. This "rule" of Cam 
eron's seems grossly realized by another member of the crew, Wishrop, who 
goes on a "cold and mad" shooting spree, beginning with his wife and her lover, 
in flagrante, and going on to his boon companions, and "lastly himself." The final 
phrase contains a crucial note for understanding the whole desire for absolute 
clarity and control besetting everyone but the poetic narrator. The desire to 
defeat mortality leads to the destruction of life, and of the self, for mortality must 
be defined as the implicit presence of death in life. One goes, and goes out with, 
the other. It is not surprising that Cameron is willing to treat the other mem 
bers of the crew as "dead people" ("all-you rise bodily from the grave"), but 
not himself ("I ain't dead ... I can prove it any day"). 
The novel does not deny that mortality may be dealt with: even in the absence 
of a plausible witch doctor or tribal god, it avoids the flat sense of hell which 
Baraka's System offers in its explicidy post-Christian universe. The seven days of 
the voyage from Mariella to the waterfall represent the interval of a new de 
creation of fixities and certitudes, without bringing on a restoration of chaos. 
Rather they constitute the amnion of a new, interfluent comprehensive life. Thus 
the crew "saw the naked unequivocal flowing peril and beauty and soul of the 
pursuer and the pursued all together, and they knew they would perish if they 
dreamed to turn back." 
But if this new sort of world is to have the cogency of dreaming, and not the 
vapid falsity of dreaminess, it needs to have effect and confirmation in human 
terms. This occurs within the poetic narrator who becomes increasingly the 
protagonist, and not just the medium of the action. In becoming "blind himself" 
Donne now takes on the function of an alter ego, and is subsumed into a system 
of illuminated uncertainty that he had wished despotically to fix and dominate. 
The poetic imagination, with its capacity at once to achieve itself and to anni 
hilate itself in exquisite conformity to any vagary and contradiction in what it 
perceives (the achievement of its object), becomes the key to existence in this 
world. Significandy the seventh day, the day of consummation, brings back 
the landscape and objects and figures of the simple factual story. The point is 
that the world begins where one finds himself, and ends where one finds himself, 
but moves without visibly moving through all space and time, which prove as 
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continuous and 
variously identical as one is oneself. The motivic word, muse, 
in Palace of the Peacock conveys at once a passive drift in the mind and its in 
spired capacity to know what is difficult and sublime. Thus the narrator can 
speak with confidence in the bewilderment of the underworld: 
I had started to walk at last . . . after a long infancy and dreaming death 
... in the midst of mutilation and chaos that had no real power to overcome 
me. 
What he comes to is virtually a Blakean vision, looking "though [the] eye" and 
not merely with it, "trusting" the world and finding that "everything," though 
at first offered as "half-finished sketches in the air," is "filled suddenly from 
within to become living and alive." Being is implicit, but not predictable in this 
state of things, and "the person," for whom the narrator stands as both spokes 
man and exemplar, must accommodate himself to a knowledge that is both suf 
ficient and problematical. 
The conventions of epistemology (and of the novel) are repudiated: 
Idle now to dwell upon and recall anything one had ever responded to 
with the sense and sensibility [pace Jane Austen] that were our outward 
manner and 
vanity and conceit. 
He acknowledges and escapes his "fear of strangeness and catastrophe" and, 
still within a basic acceptance of movement and duality, conveys the experience, 
not the meaning, of "the inner music and voice of the peacock": 
I . . . sang as I had never heard myself sing before. I felt the faces before 
me begin to fade and part company from me and from themselves as if 
our need of one another was now fulfilled, and our distance from each other 
was the distance of a sacrament, the sacrament and embrace we knew in 
one muse and one undying soul. Each of us now held at last in his arms 
what he had been forever seeking and what he had eternally possessed. 
Even so selective an array as this may give the impression that the modern 
black novelist is colonizing the underworld, imposing new mind-sets on the 
threefold culture of its original institution: the Dantesque, with its emphasis on 
due punishment and necessary purgation; the Homeric-Virgilian, with its em 
phasis on vital reconciliation and the guarantees of prophetic counsel; and the 
anthropo-mythological, with its emphasis on rebirth and redemption. But as a 
matter of fact (and perhaps also of principle) this is not the case. A resurgence 
of the underworld theme seems to mark modern fiction in general. It occurs 
conspicuously in James Joyce's Ulysses and T. S. Eliot's The Waste Land. We can 
recognize it in D. H. Lawrence, speaking in Women in Love of "the voluptuous 
resonance of darkness, the strong, dangerous underworld, mindless, inhuman," 
or 
again in "The Lost Girl," calling attention to "something [in a coalminer] 
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forever unknowable and inadmissible, something that belonged purely to the 
underground . . . knowledge humiliated, subjected, but ponderous and inevita 
ble." It appears centrally also in Lawrence's The Man Who Died. From Dostoev 
ski's Notes from the Underground to Faulkner's Light in August or Robert Penn 
Warren's Meet Me in the Green Glen or John Updike's Rabbit Redux, wherein 
an inner room 
suggests the underworld as sanctuary, it declares its presence 
and importance. Besides it occurs in the Proustian retreat, and in Jean Genet's 
prison scenes as a sort of horizontal underworld, with the vertical one growing 
archaic. Perhaps it has taken a new lease on life in Western culture as a whole. 
Surely we see it in the Freudian id, if not the Freudian womb. 
But it seems undeniable, after scrutinizing the topography of modern black 
fiction from Jean Toomer to C?mara Laye and Wilson Harris, that the black 
moderns have cultivated the underworld with particular candor and elaboration 
and perhaps intimacy. And not only cultivated but communicated it (on the 
lower frequencies, I speak for you), as though one driven to a cellar had found 
a dark treasure and transformed and redeemed the cellar by delivering it to the 
world. 
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